became known as The Whitehall Conference to consider ben Israel's petition. 10 Though there was no final resolution resulting from the conference, nor was there a revocation of the original thirteenth-century order of expulsion, there was an informal recognition that there were no legal grounds for keeping Jews out of England, and this lessened objections to the open presence of Jews.
But because there had never been any official readmission, the legal status of Jews in England remained uncertain. This uncertainty meant that subsequent English governments could-and did-impose various restrictions on the kinds of activities in which Jews could engage. 11 For instance, merchants could not open retail shops within the City of London without being so-called "freedmen." However, becoming a freeman of the City meant taking a Christian oath, which effectively shut all Jews out. 12 Moreover, admission to the monopoly trading companies, the Russia and Levant companies, in particular, was limited for Jews, and the commodities exchange in London restricted the number of Jewish brokers to twelve until 1830. 13 Jews could not sit in Parliament or vote in parliamentary elections, hold office in a municipal corporation, "occupy a place of trust under the Crown" (essentially work as a civil servant), or attend university.
These limitations on economic activities were indicative of the second-class status under which Jews operated, even if they were born in Britain and, therefore, were officially British subjects. However, by the mid-eighteenth century, around half of Jews living in Britain had not been born there, and the legal disabilities that weighed most heavily on Jews had less to do with religion per se than with their being foreign-born aliens.
14 Because they were aliens, they could not hold land or property while the Navigation Acts prohibited them from, owning shares in British ships. Foreign merchants were forced to pay "alien duties" which included special port fees and higher customs rates on many commodities-rates that were sometimes twice as high as those on native merchants. 15 But it was not possible for Jews to become naturalised in Britain because naturalisation required a special act of Parliament. This was one of the pieces of "accidental" discriminatory legislation that was initially aimed at Catholics; and the petitioner had to receive the sacrament of the Church of England before the bill of naturalisation was introduced. Because naturalisation was all but impossible for Jews in Britain to obtain, the only option was denization, which involved securing a costly letter (royal patent) granted to an individual by the monarch on the advice of his council. Denizens could engage in colonial trade, but denization was not retrospective, so a denizen's foreign-born children remained aliens and could not inherit his property. 16 Moreover, denization did not grant exemption from alien duties, and a denizen could not hold office. 17 Throughout the seventeenth century, these two methods of becoming an English subject operated simultaneously. As J.M. Ross points out, naturalisation offered more rights, but it was more cumbersome because Parliament sat infrequently, whereas the bureaucracy for issuing a letter patent operated continuously. 18 Letters patent granted to Jews often included a proviso that the grantee "shall not have nor enjoy any benefit or advantage from the said grant of our denization until he shall have taken the oath of allegiance." 19 The second point relates to the Customs duties on exports. From about 1630 patents of denization almost always included a condition requiring that the grantee shall "pay to us and to our heirs and successors custom and subsidy for his goods and merchandise at the rates which aliens pay or CREATING CONFUSION IN THE COLONIES ought to pay." 20 Exceptionally, some (but by no means all) Jews made denizens by Charles II and James II were not subjected to this standard condition; some were even specifically exempted from it. 21 Despite these exceptions, however, there seem to have been little difference between being an alien and being a denizen in terms of the alien duties, though, crucially, there was a difference in terms of inheritance. Thus, as James Shapiro writes, "The status of aliens was made up of a patchwork of overlapping and sometimes conflicting jurisdictions." 22 However, in 1740 legislation was passed that allowed foreigners who had resided for seven years in the American colonies to naturalise without a bill in Parliament, an effort clearly designed to encourage trade and colonisation in the Americas. 23 All that was required was that the applicant make a declaration of fidelity and pay a fee of two shillings to the office of the secretary of the particular colony in which he resided. In return he was granted a certificate which served as a complete naturalisation paper. 24 Jews and Quakers were exempted from the oath of abjuration and from receiving the sacrament. 25 This so-called "Plantation Act" was of little benefit to Jews living in Britain itself, and Jews in the British Atlantic colonies had more flexibility and greater rights than those in the metropole. 26 The Jews living in the Dutch Republic and Dutch Atlantic territories laboured under similar legal disabilities as those in Britain and her colonies, and their status as citizens was undefined. This uncertainty stemmed from the fact that, at least in a formal sense, there was no Dutch citizenship. Until 1795, citizenship was largely a local and urban institution conferred by birth or acquired by purchase, and probably no more than half of the urban population were formal citizens of the many cities and towns of the country. 27 In this respect, the Dutch Republic differed little from the rest of Europe, as municipally-based citizenship was the norm in most of Europe, where formal citizenship status was at the core of the urban polity.
Urban citizens could count on judicial, economic, political, and social rights. Only citizens had a direct entrée into political power by serving in major municipal functions, and all the local councillors were citizens. 28 In the Dutch Republic, local affairs, as represented by the councillors, also tended to be provincial affairs, which in turn had an important impact on national affairs. Therefore, having a say in local affairs, especially as a member of the city council, was of great political importance. 29 There were other clear advantages to holding formal citizenship, as well. Foremost of these was entrance to the guilds, which held a monopoly in the production of, and trade in, many or most goods and services. But not all trades were organised in guilds. In Amsterdam the trade in sugar, diamonds, and tobacco were outside the guild structure in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries-all trades in which, not coincidentally, Jews came to dominate. This structure also meant, ultimately, that a significant part of the labour market was available for non-burgers in Amsterdam. 30 This relative flexibility in the labour market meant that the position of the "inhabitants" (ingezetenen) or resident non-citizens in Amsterdam, as well as in most Dutch cities and towns, was not so bad. The municipalities gave their non-citizen residents the same protection under the law that their citizens had, including property rights. 31 Hence, as historians Maarten Prak and Jan Luiten van Zanden argue, "Formal citizenship is merely one, albeit arguably the most significant, among a range of statuses embodying elements of citizenship." 32 The Jews straddled sever-al categories along this spectrum of citizenship statuses on the Dutch Republic, specifically in Amsterdam. Jews were admissible as burghers in Amsterdam, but with various restrictions placed upon them, as was the case for Jews in Britain. In Amsterdam there was only one clause in the various charters regarding citizenship which concerned religion, and this related to the Jews. 33 In fact, the only exception to the general rule that all citizens of Amsterdam were equal was the Jews. Nevertheless, the presence of Jews, and the exercise of their religious practices, was accepted and to some degree celebrated. The well-known political economist, Pieter de la Court, lauded Amsterdam, where
Next to the freedom to worship God comes freedom to make one's living for all inhabitants. Here [in Amsterdam] it is very necessary to attract foreigners. And although this is of disadvantage to some old residents who would like to keep the best solely for themselves and pretend that a citizen should have preferences above a stranger, the truth of the matter is that a state which is not self-sufficient must constantly draw new inhabitants to it or perish. 34 In line with this approach of economic utility, the community was allowed to organise itself, religiously and socially. Both the Sephardim and, later, the Ashkenazi Jews, could hold their own worship services and build their own synagogues. 35 Nevertheless, the boundaries of their community were sharply drawn and strictly guarded. Intermarriage with, and conversion of, Dutch subjects were not allowed, and they had no claim on common poor relief, being obliged, instead, to care for their own poor. 36 In addition to these restrictions, in 1632, it was decided that Jews could not enter the guilds. 37 There was a separate Jewish citizenship oath, which was in Portuguese, and this restriction was stated in the oath. It was also stated that citizenship could not be passed on to the children and that, therefore, Jews must purchase their citizenship anew in each generation. 38 This was in contrast to Britain, which allowed those born on British soil to be subjects and to pass such rights on to their children, even if they were Jews. Nevertheless, as David Katz notes, the Anglo-Jewish community, despite the endenization of some of its leading figures, was neither alien nor citizen. 39 And this comparison with Britain raises the question of whether the legal status of Jews in the Dutch Republic was different from that of other dissenters. In Britain it was not. Essentially, Jews and dissenters suffered under the same restrictions. Historian Peter van Rooden believes that initially the treatment of the Jews was different from that of other dissenters in the Dutch Republic, but that over time it ceased to be. However, van Rooden argues that this was not the result of a change in the way that Jews were treated. On the contrary, he asserts that the policies towards other dissenting groups became more like those that had always governed Jews." 40 Despite the fact that the legal status of the Jews was similar to that of Christian dissenters in both countries, there was a clear difference in how Jews were perceived vis-à-vis dissenters. A typical view expressed in mid-eighteenth century Britain was that of Sir Edmund Isham, a Tory MP who drew a distinction between Jews and other would-be immigrants in a speech to the House of Commons:
...the Jews are not like French [Huguenot] refugees, or German Protestants: these in a generation or two become so incorporated with us, that there is no distinguishing them from the rest of the people: their children or grandchildren, are no longer French or German or of the French or German nation, but become truly English, and deem themselves to be of the English nation. But...Jews can never be incorporated with us: they must forever remain Jews, and will always deem themselves to be of the Hebrew not the English nation. 41 For Isham, Jews were simply unassimilable and their presence in Britain or her colonies was therefore unwelcome. Analogous debates in the Dutch parliament show how deeply ingrained ideas of Jewish "strangeness" actually were, even into the nineteenth century-the point at which Jews were supposedly fully "emancipated" and, thereby, completely incorporated into the Dutch nation. As late as 1873, a representative in the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament, Johannes Haffmans, said of the Jews, "They are strangers here. We [Catholics] are at home here." 42 For Haffmans, the unassimilability of the Jews was their essential difference from Christians, even Catholics who had once laboured under laws even more discriminatory than those targeting Jews.
Charles Tilly quite rightly states that "the word citizenship causes confusion." 43 This confusion is caused, in part, by the fact that citizenship can have so many gradations, as was the case of the Jews (and other groups) in early modern Britain and the Dutch Republic. These gradations, in turn, implied many different levels of belonging because, as Tilly writes, "As a category, citizenship designates a set of actors-citizens-distinguished by their shared privileged position vis-à-vis some particular state. As a tie, citizenship identifies an enforceable mutual relation between an actor and state agents. As a role, citizenship includes all of an actor's relations to others that depend on the actor's relation to a particular state. And as an identity, citizenship can refer to the experience and public representation of category, tie or role." 44 In the case of the Jews, the multiple, and often confusing, meanings of citizenship so clearly expressed by Tilly-a category, a tie, a role, and, most of all, an identity-created a discomfort that is nowhere more evident than during the early modern period.
Although diatribes such as those given in their respective parliaments by Isham and Haffmans could-and were-voiced against other outsiders, they were most often specifically targeted at Jews. As Frank Felsenstein argues, "[The Jew] is the perpetual outsider whose unsettling presence serves to define the bounds that separate the native Englishman from the alien Other." 45 This dichotomy was likely less sharply drawn in the Dutch Republic. Nevertheless, there was a clear popular understanding of the Jew as an unsettled and possibly unsettling Other within the Dutch imagination. Popular Dutch pamphlets from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries emphasise the seemingly intrinsic difference between (Christian) Dutch men and women and Jews. As early as 1603 when there were, at best, only a handful of Jews in the Dutch Republic, and what Jews there were nearly all lived in Amsterdam, a pamphlet was published, in which the Bishop of Schleswig purportedly claimed to have met the wandering Jew, Ahasuerus. All the tropes about Jews that would later become so familiar-no fixed abode, continually punished for the betrayal of Jesus, a usurious nature and prone to criminality-appear in this pamphlet. 46 Jews were also popular subjects of ridicule for their accents (especially the Yiddish-speaking Ashkenazim), their manners, and their professions. 47 This continued assertion of the otherness and unassimilability of Jews demonstrates the sharp distinction between "us" and "them" that was central to the formation of early modern communities, and, by extension, early modern conceptions of citizenship. This is because citizenship in the early modern period was, in addition to Tilly's formulation, an instrument of social regulation. 48 As a category of belonging that endowed people with specific rights and duties, citizenship allowed for the drawing of boundaries and distinctions between those who belonged and those who did not. By its nature, the status of citizen created juridical, political, economic, and social bonds between the individual and the state. 49 It was this creation of social bonds and the recognition of shared belongingTilly's citizenship as identity-that created the most unease with regard to the Jews. But being a recognised citizen (or subject, in the case of the British) had not only great symbolic but also great economic, importance. 50 Thus, it was most often in the economic sphere that anxieties about what it meant to include Jews in the shared community played themselves out. This was nowhere more visible than in Jewish participation in the settlement and economic exploitation of the Dutch and British Atlantic overseas' possessions. The next section will discuss how the discomfort with including Jews in the colonial enterprise manifested itself in the Dutch and British Atlantic settlements.
An abundance of such settlements scattered over a vast region offer numerous cases to draw upon. I have centred my discussion on cases of discrimination against Jews in Curaçao (and, briefly, Suriname) and Jamaica when there were also numerous incidents in Barbados or the North American settlements. 51 And despite a surfeit of information, I have not discussed the unique case of New Holland (Dutch Brazil) at all. 52 There is, admittedly, a certain arbitrariness implied by my choices. However, due to the constraints of time and space, I have had to limit my discussion to a few illustrative examples to prove my point.
Questions of Belonging: Contested Citizenship in the Colonies
Both the British and the Dutch government (Company) officials actively encouraged Jewish settlement in their Atlantic colonies-settlement that was loosely guided by and based upon regulations regarding Jewish rights to reside in the metropole, as described above. However, non-Jewish settlers and, often, colonial administrators, were frequently unwilling to fully accept Jews into their respective folds. This difficulty centred on the navigation between the economic imperatives of empires, as dictated from the metropole and carried out by locally-based colonial administrators, on the one hand, and deeply ingrained ideas of what it meant to belong-or not-as part of an economic and socially constructed community. After all, Jews were not only deft economic competitors, but the unassimilable "Other." All of which resulted in a patchwork of sometimes conflicting regulations and attitudes regarding Jews in the British and Dutch colonies.
Belonging in the English Atlantic-Discrimination in Jamaica Take, for instance, the case of the Jews in the British colony of Jamaica. This island was initially under-populated, and it was official policy to attract settlers by dispensing with oaths of allegiance and offering freedom of religion. 53 In instructions dated December 31, 1670, Sir Thomas Lynch, Lieutenant-Governor of Jamaica, was ordered to give all possible encouragement to persons of differing religions by dispensing with the oaths of allegiance and supremacy (except to officials of the Council) and "finding some other way of securing allegiance," and he was to suffer no man "to be molested in the exercise of his religion, so he be content with a quiet and peaceable enjoying of it." 54 In July of 1672, the council wrote that "for the better settling and improving of your Majesty's Island of Jamaica, due encouragement may be given to the Jews, the Dutch, and other nations to settle and inhabit there." 55 Thus, in the furtherance of imperial economic objectives during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, colonial governors were expected to tolerate Jews, allow them to worship publicly and to practice their religious rites and traditions. "They observe most of their ancient feasts and fasts," noted one member of the Jamaican elite, "marry, circumcise, and bury according to the custom of their forefathers." 56 This despite the fact that the Jews were suspected of conniving with the enemy and with any other non-English people. As one complaint went, "If the Spanish had the courage they could take the island [of Jamaica]. The island is inhabited by English, Scots, Irish and Jews. Two-thirds are not loyal to the government. They might prove a broken reed if attacked." 57 But by the passage of the Naturalization Act of 1740, authorised over the objections of island legislature, the colonial governors were expected to do more than just tolerate the Jews. 58 This act made lawful the naturalisation of Jews-but not Catholics-by individual colonies.
Although Jamaican officials did permit the naturalisation of Jews, other colonies were more reluctant, and the act certainly did not put a stop to discrimination. In a celebrated case, the prominent Jewish merchants Aaron Lopez and Isaac Elizur of Newport, Rhode Island, were denied naturalisation in 1761 and 1762. 59 In Rhode Island, "Jews were promised only such 'protection here as any strangers being not of our nation residing amongst us'." 60 This ruling illustrates the fact that Jews were viewed first and foremost as strangers and as manifestly alien. That being said, Lopez and Elizur were relatively easily able to circumvent Rhode Island's discriminatory ruling by going to nearby colonies where they were naturalised. Elizur went to New York and was naturalised in 1763 and Lopez went to Massachusetts, where he was naturalised in Boston in 1762. They then returned to Newport where they could now enjoy the full advantages of citizenship. 61 Although citizenship could be denied in various places, subject to the whims of colonial administrators, once someone was naturalised, his naturalisation was meant to be applicable everywhere.
Despite some discomfort with what James Shapiro describes as "...the especially pernicious...Jewish Other that kept trying to claim for itself a part of Englishness ...," 62 the 1740 act, as various scholars have remarked, gave (professing) Jews in the British colonies of the Atlantic "an unprecedented forum for the expansion of Jewish rights of citizenship." 63 Lois Dubin has claimed that the particular circumstances of the British Atlantic colonies resulted in greater "relaxation and renegotiation" of political and religious conventions in comparison with the metropole. 64 Yet passage of this act did not significantly challenge the position of Jews as social outsiders in Jamaica (or the rest of the British colonies). Notwithstanding their right to be naturalised as British subjects, most Jews were thought to be "selfish and tricking," as well as "fraudulent in their trade," and most certainly not truly British. 65 Though there was some uneasiness with Jews, and anti-Jewish stereotypes endured within the popular imagination, Jews were still allowed many of the privileges of other white colonists, including trading in and owning slaves. 66 On Barbados and Jamaica, Jewish planters owned slaves, though never a large proportion of the total slave population on the islands, which is line with the fact that there were relatively few Jewish planters. Just like other white colonists, Jews bought slaves for resale and redistribution (so-called "refuse slaves") in the inter-Caribbean transit trade. 67 Eli Faber demonstrates that Jewish investment in the Royal African Company (RAC) reached its peak in the mid-1690s and lasted until the second decade of the eighteenth century. 68 During this time, the RAC accounted for around 20 per cent of the English slave trade, and Jews owned about 10 per cent of RAC shares. 69 Generally, Jewish involvement in the slave trade in the eighteenth century fluctuated with the vicissitudes of the Atlantic economy. Only in two British colonies did Jewish participation in the slave trade rise above the approximately 6 to 7 per cent that had been the norm for Jewish involvement in the seventeenth century. 70 This Jewish participation in the slave trade has been a topic of vociferous debate in the past two decades. 71 This debate emerged despite the fact that Jews, either openly professing Jews or those of Jewish descent such as New Christians, participating in the slave trade had long been known and acknowledged. 72 Within the context of this discussion, what is most important to note about this Jewish involvement in the ownership of and trade in enslaved Africans is that it was proportionate to that of other white, non-Jewish, colonists.
Though in this vital element of life in the British Atlantic colonies Jews were more or less equal to non-Jews, in the same year that parliament allowed for the naturalisation of Jews in most of the colonies and thereby put them on an equal footing with non-Jews, the Jamaican Assembly asserted that Jews controlled too much of the island's commerce and "have almost entirely engrossed the whole retail trade of this island." 73 Jews were, therefore, "a great growing evil" who were driving the Christian citizenry from their trades and literally taking bread from the mouths of their children, a grievance that was repeated throughout the islands. 74 As C.S. Monoco notes, "Colonists felt greatly impeded in what they saw as their natural right: returning to England as wealthy men (and as rapidly as possible)." 75 Monoco goes on to explain that disparities between local Caribbean interests and the metropole become imperative in contextualising the broad array of measures taken against Jews on the British islands. 76 Naturalisation was hotly debated in Britain-a debate which culminated in the so-called "Jew Bill" of 1753, which has been discussed at great length in many fine studies of Anglo-Jewry. 77 Therefore, I will only briefly summarise it here. The fairly modest goal of this bill was to allow foreign-born Jews who had lived at least three years in either Great Britain or Ireland to be naturalised as British subjects by a private petition to Parliament without having to take the Anglican sacrament. As aliens, foreign-born Jews could not hold land or property, had to pay up to twice as much duty on imports (until alien duties were abolished in 1784), could not own British ships, and could not act as factors or merchants in the colonial trade. 78 The law's procedures were expensive, complicated and intended only for a small group of wealthy Sephardic merchants. The ultimate goal of the bill was to further the nation's economic prosperity, which was thought to be advanced by encouraging the immigration of more wealthy Sephardic traders, who would be more likely to come to Britain if they could easily naturalise. What resulted from this bill was an ocean of pamphlets both pro and con. Most pamphleteers who inveighed against the naturalisation of Jews believed that Jewish immigrants would ultimately unravel the fabric of British society. 79 Or as one writer put it, the consequence of naturalising the Jews will be "our own Destruction as a people." 80 This pervasive belief in the destructive nature of Jewish colonists spawned local anti-Jewish legislation that led to disproportionate taxation, restrictions on the right to testify in court, and impeding access to valued trading licenses, among other limitations. 81 Laws passed in Jamaica were often designed to be as offensive as possible to Jewish residents, including an act that grouped "convicts, Jews...sick, decripped [decrepit], or disabled persons" as a pariah class. 82 Edward Long, the oftquoted, eighteenth-century historian of Jamaica, noted that even those Jews who had undergone the expensive and lengthy process of naturalisation were effectively on an equal footing with free blacks because both groups shared an almost identical social stigma and "limited freedom" and could neither vote nor hold elected office. 83 Not surprisingly, then, the minutes of the meetings of the Jamaican assembly are chock full of calumnies against Jews and record many (unsuccessful) attempts, in the form of petitions to the king, to remove Jews from the islands completely for, among other reasons, being descended from the crucifiers of Jesus." 84 Holly Snyder rightly frames these discriminatory acts as part of an attempt to keep "undesirable" groups including Jews, freed Blacks, Catholics, Quakers, and those of mixed race from taking part in local politics or in any other way threatening the existing political hegemony of Englishman over their non-English compatriots. 85 But they also illustrate the difficulties in conceptualising the idea of Jews as English full stop. Tamar Herzog writes that "Naturalization allowed [people] to truly transform themselves by abandoning the natural allegiance to their community of birth, and by adopting a new nature...Citizenship was not only a civil institution established by the community but also an institution that changed the nature of people." 86 But the colonists of Jamaica were not sure that Jews could ever abandon their natural allegiance to "the Hebrew nation" and change their (assumedly unassimilable) nature.
This was an accusation that Jews in England addressed directly in a petition entitled The Case of the Jews Stated which was written in 1689 as an appeal against a bill for special parliamentary taxation of the Jews. In this document they claim that the very fact that they are "homeless" as a nation makes them better and more desirable subjects. They write "that the Jews being a nation that cannot lay claim to any country do never remove from any part where they are tolerated and protected. And therefore may be looked upon to be a greater advantage to this kingdom than any other foreigners, who commonly, so soon as they got good estates, return with them into their own countries." 87 The Jews were also anxious to disavow any ideas the English government or public might have had of a worldwide unity of "the Hebrew Nation," if for no other reason than to discourage further attempts at extra taxation based on the (mistaken) belief that Jews in other lands would pay. Later in the petition they explicitly state, Whereas the Jews are informed that there is a rumour goes about, That what these who are not able to pay, the Jews in other Parts will make up, looking upon them all to make but one Body, though at never so great a distance from each other: They humbly take leave to represent, that in Truth every one particular Man among them subsists of himself, without dependence on any other; And that they cannot expect any Assistance, or Relief from any other place whatsoever. 88 This petition makes clear that the Jews in England were beginning to base their arguments for rights upon their utility and their loyalty, which is a pattern that would grow ever stronger in both the British and Dutch Atlantic territories in the following century.
Belonging in the Dutch Atlantic-Discrimination on Curaçao
In contrast to the English, naturalisation as a topic seems to have raised little debate in the Dutch Republic, perhaps because it was already officially necessary to naturalise if one moved to a different province within this loose confederation. That meant that there tended to be little in the way of overarching identity attached to the procedure. 89 It was, largely, a pro forma procedure in the Dutch Republic. In keeping with this approach, neither the province of Holland nor the States General of the United Provinces ever promulgated what could really be said to be a uniform policy toward Jews in general or to their naturalisation specifically. This was not surprising given the rather fractured nature of the Dutch polity. One of the only statements that can be defined as a policy towards the Jews as such was issued by both the States of Holland and the States General in 1657. This declaration stated that Jews were "subjects" of the Dutch Republic, and was issued over and against the seizures of Jewish-owned ships and cargoes by the Spaniards. 90 Though the Jews were, therefore, declared to be subjects (despite the lack of a monarchy) of the Dutch Republic, individual cities were allowed to decide whether they wanted to admit Jews, the only proviso being that cities and towns that did choose to admit them could not compel Jews to wear any distinguishing marks. 91 As had been the case in Jamaica and other British Atlantic colonies, the Dutch West India Company (WIC) had a clear policy of encouraging immigration to its Atlantic territories, including the immigration of Jews. To take just one example, Governor Jacob Beck advocated free immigration to Curaçao. He informed the WIC directors, "Since the island depends on commerce for its existence and that is what brings in and augments your income, any stranger, no matter of what nationality is encouraged and received decently by me so that he will settle here." 92 In general, the rights granted to Jews in the Dutch colonies in the Americas gave them unprecedented privileges. They could retain their separate communal autonomy, yet could claim, in effect, to be naturalised citizens of the Netherlands. Historian Hayim Yerushalami even believes that the Jews "had arrived at the closest point to full legal equality possible for Jews prior to the emergence of the modern nationstate." 93 Yerushalami was writing about Curaçao, but it was Suriname that was best known for the privileges offered to Jews, thanks to the famous Essai historique in which Sephardic Jew David Nassy goes to great lengths to praise the situation of the Jews in this Dutch colony. Nassy writes that "there is perhaps no other place in the world where religious tolerance is more extensive and more strictly observed, without there ever having been any discussion or controversy whatsoever, than in Surinam." 94 Jewish community leaders were able to exert extensive control over the community, including exiling members; Jewish marriages were considered legitimate even without a civil equivalent; Jews were allowed to serve in the civil militias; and Jewish slaves could work on Sundays. 95 Yet despite these rights and privileges resulting from an officially-sanctioned desire for settlers in the Dutch Atlantic colonies, the reality of a Jewish presence in these territories caused unease on the part of other settlers, WIC functionaries (both local and in the metropole), Reformed clergy, and government officials. When it came to the rights and privileges that Jews would enjoy in the Dutch Atlantic colonies, this unease played itself out in the same sort of gap between official policy and actual practice that was so evident in the British Atlantic colonies. For example, Jews in Surinam could not be elected to the court of police nor exercise any public office other than that of notary and assistant tax collector. 96 Nor were Jews appointed to most positions within the colonial government, and no Jews served on the ruling policy council. 97 Jews on Curaçao could not vote at all for the ruling council of Curaçao, whereas in St. Eustatius, as in Suriname, they could take part in the elections, but not serve on the ruling council itself. 98 Thus, the Jews (mostly Sephardim until the later part of the eighteenth century), within a seemingly uniform Dutch Atlantic world faced a range of challenges and were welcomed in some places and not in others. 99 It is not surprising that Yosef Kaplan characterises as "rigid and even hostile" the attitude adopted by authorities on Curaçao toward the Jewish minority. 100 There were complaints by non-Jewish residents objecting to competition from Jews. There were also intermittent attempts to limit the economic and political freedoms of Jews on the island. These attempts were as likely to come from WIC officials as they were from other settlers. And these challenges to Jewish rights on Curaçao do call into question historian Wim Klooster's statement that "even unofficial antiSemitism seems to have been a rare phenomenon" on Curaçao. 101 In fact, the first half of the eighteenth century was rife with discriminatory actions against the Jews actively encouraged, if not instigated, by WIC officials. 102 As had been the case on Jamaica, in 1713 the governor and island council insisted that the Jews should be taxed as a group and that the parnassim should be held responsible for ensuring the payment of the special levy-a stipulation that was not placed on Protestants. 103 Moreover, in 1717 the island council refused to admit the oath "on the Law of Moses" of a Jew, Isaac de Moises Henriquez Cothinho, who was accused of insulting non-Jews. He languished in prison for ten months before his oath was finally admitted. 104 When this same ill-fated Cothinho was murdered by three Frenchmen in 1720, the fiscaal (prosecutor) van Bergen was strongly suspected of letting the killers escape to Martinique, and when the Jewish community complained to the council, they were ordered "not to protest but to obey." 105 And, as in Jamaica, standard calumnies about Jews were commonly uttered in public and during island council meetings. In 1727, at a gathering called by the Governor Du Fay to increase import duties to cover the costs of building a hospital on the island, council member Frederick Eck warned that the Jews would be "resorting to trickery and not pay." At this same contentious meeting, another prominent colonist called the Jews "damned smonches" who dealt with the Spaniards illegally. The situation escalated from name-calling to physical threats when someone shouted "Let's fall upon the Jews and throw them over the wall". Eck subsequently complained that Jews were in control of the island's shipping and that they were privateers. 106 When the Jewish community protested, Governor Du Fay echoed Eck's grievance when he wrote to the WIC council that "The Jews should not be allowed to come out triumphant, particularly since business is in their hands." 107 All these complaints repeat the usual slurs directed at Jews as the tricky businessmen, smugglers, and monopolisers of trade.
This defamation is, perhaps, not particularly surprising given that Jews comprised a rather large percentage of the white European population in the Dutch Atlantic colonies. Estimates vary as to the exact number of Jews and the precise percentage of the white population they comprised. According to the foremost historians of the Curaçoan Jewish community, Suzanne and Isaac Emmanuel, Curaçao's total population in 1785 was 8,500, of which 3,000 to 3,200 were white and around 1,200 of these whites were Jews. In other words, close to forty percent of the white population of the island was Jewish. 108 Wim Klooster examines the population of Jews in Willemstad, Curacao's capital and major city, and estimates that by the middle of the eighteenth century, the number of Jewish families was nearly half that of white non-Jews. Based on WIC tax records, Klooster believes that by 1789 there were about 6,000 free residents in Willemstad, which included free blacks and "coloureds", most of whom were Catholics, as well as 2,469 Protestants and 1,095 Jews. 109 Whatever the exact numbers, the Jews were quite visible in the economic and social life of the island at a time when their actual status as citizens, both in the colonies and in the Republic itself, remained somewhat undefined.
This indefinite legal and social status contributed to the continued vilification of Jews on the island in the following decades. Governor Du Fay's replacement, Governor van Collen, and his fiscaal van Schagen, wrote frequently to the WIC governing board in the Dutch Republic, saying, among other things, that there were "seven Jews to one Christian" and "like the Jesuits they were taking over." They even asserted that Jews accounted for almost three-quarters of the island's population, a blatant untruth, as the Emmanuels' and Klooster's numbers show. 110 These statements clearly played on Dutch Protestants' pervasive fear of being overwhelmed by Catholics and Jews. These concerns are further seen in complaints that "no decent houses remained for Christians" and that the parnassim "have built a large, imposing church to make a name for themselves." 111 Jews were not to be trusted because, "according to the Talmud one may deceive another." 112 Moreover, contrary to objections (some made by the exact same complainants) that Jews monopolised trade and reduced the prices of merchandise, thereby ruining the island, the Jews were also poor and "there were too many needy Jews" and "the new Jewish arrivals were poor or of ill conduct." 113 That some settlers and WIC officials in Curaçao drew upon pervasive anti-Jewish stereotypes and rhetoric is not particularly unexpected. These sentiments express the same anxieties that the British colonists and colonial administrators voiced about incorporating Jews into their social order. On Curaçao, as Klooster says, "The cumulative effect of decades of connivance...was a wide variety of unwritten laws, which tended to deviate substantially from those upheld in the metropolis." 114 Thus, it is not surprising that there was low-level but persistent discrimination against Jews in Curaçao (and other Dutch Atlantic territories) and that this deviated from the official policy established in the metropolis, like the decree promulgated by the States General in July of 1657 according to which Jews and those of Jewish descent were equals as regards their rights abroad and foremost on the High Seas. As Dutch citizens, they enjoyed all the rights, privileges and immunities granted to nationals of the Netherlands, with the important exception of full political representation.
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Contesting Citizenship in the Colonies
The unswerving defence of Jews as Dutch citizens overseas (though not in the Republic itself) when confronted with foreign powers, particularly the Spanish, had a clear economic rationale. Even before the States General's general proclamation, the Dutch government had asserted in a diplomatic missive to the King of Spain that, "Portuguese Jews captured aboard a frigate called le Faulcon, travelling from Pernambuco in Brazil to Martinique were brought by adverse winds to Jamaica where they were put in prison. Their release is demanded by virtue of the fact that they are Netherlands nationals and residents" (my italics). 116 This was followed by several other incidents involving Jewish merchants. For example, in July 23, 1657, the States General demanded the release of the goods and Portuguese Jews captured en route to the island of Barbados by Biscayan pirates and only a week later a similar request was given to the Spanish ambassador in The Hague regarding Jews in another incident. Thus, the States General clearly felt compelled to make a public declaration of the status of their Jewish overseas traders in order to protect their valuable cargoes and economic interests. 117 But this pragmatic decision did not mean that the States General were prepared to accept that Jews could be full citizens, at least not if it was not in their economic interest to do so. Indeed, both the Dutch and the English were opportunistic in their interpretation of what citizenship meant vis-à-vis Jews, whether in their own country or another. In a telling controversy that erupted after Abraham Crijnssen conquered the settlement of Surinam for the Dutch in 1667, the Dutch stalled in allowing Jewish settlers to leave with the other English colonists as the terms of the peace treaty stipulated. One of the English negotiators wrote to the English government that "The Hollanders denied that the Jewes were his Majesties subjects or free denizens." 118 The Dutch argued that the Articles of Surrender mentioned only the "English" in the Dutch and English language translations and that, by their very nature, Jews could not be English. Interestingly, the English implicitly accepted this point and did not argue that the Jews were English. Instead, they turned to the original Latin document which said that all "subjects" of the English king were free to leave. 119 The English negotiators also pointed out that, by the Dutch interpretation, the Scotch and Irish might not be able to leave either because they were not English.
Negotiations were drawn out over seven years on behalf of ten Portuguese Jewish planters with 322 slaves who desired to immigrate to Jamaica from Surinam under the terms of the Treaty of Breda, and, eventually, the Jews were allowed to leave. At the same time, the government that denied the privileges of English subject to Jews, even those long resident or born on English soil, was quick enough to insist that Jews resident in Surinam were English subjects because it was economically advantageous to do so. 120 Likewise, the Dutch, who were more than willing to assert that Jews were Dutch nationals and residents when they and their valuable cargoes were captured by the Spanish, would quibble over whether or not Jews could be or were English when they hoped to retain these valuable settlers for their own recently-won colony, though they still did not give Jews full citizenship rights in the Republic itself. 121 The unease occasioned by the uncertain citizenship status most often played out in the economic sphere, usually via the courts, as the boundaries between law and popular perception were negotiated in the colonial Atlantic world. For instance, though the English insisted that the Jews in Surinam were English subjects, various colonial officials were less sure. In a well-known case from the seventeenth century, Royal Customs agent Samuel Hayne claimed that the thirty-five Jewish traders who had goods on the ship Experiment were guilty of trying the cheat the Crown out of £154 in alien duties due under the Navigation Acts. 122 His claim was based on the fact that the Jewish traders had entered the cargo under the name of the captain, an English Quaker, because they were unable to trade as English subjects. When Antonio Gomesserra and Antonio Baruch Lousada, two endenized Jewish merchant partners, came forward and claimed the cargo, a jury ruled in their favour. Haynes was outraged and later wrote a pamphlet claiming that Jews, whether endenized or not, would always constitute a separate and unequal class of subjects. 123 All this shows that English law, as promulgated in the metropolis, upheld a definition of citizenship that included Jews despite the very real and pervasive popular repugnance at, and unease with, the idea that Jews could be Englishmen.
The equally well-known case of the Jewish merchant Rabba Couty emphasises this popular repugnance. 124 In 1671 Couty's ship, The Tryall, was seized upon arrival in Jamaica because it was not an English ship. Couty appeared before the Admiralty Court and presented a license from the governor of New York stating that he was an English denizen. However, the court ruled that "hee [Couty] was no Denizen" and that "Rabba Couty being not an Englishman, but a Jew was for this cause to be accompted a Forreigner" and should promptly be condemned to lose his boat and its cargo as a prize, which is precisely what happened. 125 The Couty case underscores the fact that no matter what the law said, in the English Atlantic world popular opinion held that Jews were outsiders and not legitimate citizens.
These sorts of cases were not limited to the British Atlantic, however. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, Jews were refused passports to go to the Dutch colonies of Essequibo and Demerara, which was in stark contrast to the encouragement Jews had continually received to settle in neighbouring Suriname. 126 The WIC officials asserted that prospective Jewish settlers were undesirable, and even dangerous, as colonists and alleged that Jews in Suriname were known to buy goods stolen by slaves from their masters, and thereby encouraged the slaves' bad behaviour. David Nassy wrote that the "magistrates of Essequibo and Demerary, subjects of the Republic of Holland, have again fabricated invectives against the Jews." 127 Nassy believed that these accusations came from "fear of having them [the Jews] as competitors in their unfortunate colonies." 128 Whatever the reasons behind this refusal to allow Jews into these colonies, the fact that they could be singled out as a group and refused admission to a Dutch Atlantic settlement shows that how the status of Jews was negotiated depended on local arrangements, including the power of the governors and ruling councils of the various settlements.
In this respect, not much had changed in the century since Peter Stuyvesant, governor of New Amsterdam, tried to stem the influx of Jews from Dutch Brazil into his colony. Stuyvesant said that "To give liberty to the Jews will be very detrimental." He warned that they would take business from Christians. Moreover, allowing the Jews in New Amsterdam would set a bad precedent. Once Jews were permitted, "we cannot refuse the Lutherans and Papists." 129 As James Home Williams points out, even as Jews with a Dutch identity were being asked to leave New Amsterdam, English refugees from New England were forming towns a few miles away on western Long Island. Although the Dutch rightly questioned their loyalty, Stuyvesant assumed the best from the English because they were "brothers" in the Calvinist religion-a brotherhood in which Jews could never share. 130 Ordered by the WIC to allow Jews in the colony, Stuyvesant and his council did their level best to deny them the rights and privileges of Dutch citizenship. In April 1657, Asser Levy petitioned for burgher rights, the first Jew to do so. He argued that the same privileges had already been granted to Jews in the Netherlands and he presented a copy of his poortersbrief from the City of Amsterdam to help make his case. The rights and privileges granted to Jews in Amsterdam served as the model for rights and privileges in the colonies. 131 However, this logic initially failed to prove persuasive in New Amsterdam. 132 Acquisition of citizenship or the burgher right was of great importance to the Jewish settlers not just because of the legitimation of belonging it brought, but also because of the economic entrée it gave them. For instance, a regulation adopted in New Amsterdam around 1654 held that "henceforward, traders arriving cannot trade without setting up and keeping an open store in a hired or owned house or rooms, and to ask the common or small burgher right (paying 20 guilders therefor) and have subjected themselves by subjection or promise of oath to bear their burden, expenses, expeditions and watches like other burghers and citizens". 133 As a result, failure to attain the status of citizen would likely also mean financial failure.
As is clear from the various examples of discriminatory actions in the British and Dutch Atlantic-extra or excessive taxation, general defamatory remarks and threats, and attempts to limit the economic possibilities of Jews, not to mention limited access to political participation and representation -non-Jewish settlers and colonial administrators were frequently unwilling to fully accept Jews into their respective folds. They often restricted Jews' economic opportunities by contesting their status as citizens deserving of the rights and privileges implied by belonging to a given polity. Yet these attempts to curb the economic and political rights of Jews came from the settlers and colonial officials in the colonies themselves. The governments in Britain and the Dutch Republic almost unwaveringly supported their Jewish settlers, as we shall see in the following section. All of which illustrates the difficulty in navigating between the economic imperatives of empires dictated by the metropole which had to be carried out by locally-based colonial administrators. Living side-by-side with Jews, competing (and sometimes cooperating) with them meant that those in the colonies were confronted with deeply ingrained ideas of what it meant to belong-or not-to an economically and socially constructed community.
Assertion of Belonging: Obligations, Rights, and Allegiance
The Jews, for their part, were generally able to play off competing colonial interests against each other. Thanks to an intimate knowledge of their privileges under various systems of law, they were skilful in employing legal and rhetorical arguments to assert their rights in the colonies. Their arguments not only focused on the finer points of law but also employed a rhetoric of loyalty and belonging. Proving loyalty and asserting belonging often meant demanding the right to fulfil duties such as serving in the civil militias, in order to emphasise the reciprocity of obligations between the state and its citizens.
In the case mentioned above, the Jewish communities of Amsterdam and Surinam actively protested the decision not to grant passports to Jews to settle in Essequibo and Demerara-a controversy that occurred between 1774 and 1776. They wrote directly to the Provincial States of Holland and then to the States General itself addressing the issue of the refusal to allow Jewish settlement in these territories. They addressed the claim that Jews were known to engage in illicit acts, including buying stolen goods from slaves, but they did not directly refute it. Instead, in a series of appeals, the Jewish community asserted their rights to settle on the basis of legal precedents, they appealed to the Dutch Republic's economic interests, and they argued that theirs was a case of simple fairness.
The parnassim wrote the States General that, "The Nation [the Jews] have been admitted to all the colonies and islands which belong to this Republic...and have been recognized by the High and Mighty States of Holland as subjects and residents of this Republic, and...are therefore respectfully confident that they shall be allowed to enjoy the same rights which are enjoyed by the other residents of this State." 134 Though they go on to "humbly request" that their case be considered, the parnassim then rather assertively declare, "those of Portuguese Jewish Nation are entitled [emphasis mine], like the other residents of this State, to continue to settle in Essequibo and Demerara, as well as in the other Colonies and islands of this State." 135 Thus, they stress that they hold the same rights as any other residents, despite the fact that they are Jewish. In fact, they are, they argue, entitled to these rights.
In a separate document to the assembly of the province of Holland, the Jewish community declared that the reasons for their request to settle in Essequibo and Demerara "shall be found to be entirely legal and sufficient, the more so since the Suppliants are so fortunate to be able to appeal to a resolution of Your High and Mightinesses of the 12th of July 1657 by which those of the Jewish Nation in this country were declared...subjects...and residents of these same United Netherlands and as such entitled to enjoy the conditions, rights and advantages...for the residents of this State." 136 This passage shows that the Jewish community knew their rights, were aware of legal precedents, and would not hesitate to point out the ille-gality of refusing them the right of settlement. To emphasise this point, they even included a copy of the decree issued by the States General in 1657 upon which they based their arguments in support of their claims.
Beyond their entitlements as subjects-rights equal to those of other residentsto settle in the colonies, and the legal precedents ensuring these rights, the parnassim also adroitly focused on fairness. Taking on the excuse proffered by the directors of Essequibo and Demerara-that Jews engaged in illicit activities and were, therefore, undesirable colonists-the leaders of the Jewish community asserted that "even if it is true that among those of the Nation...there have been such who were so perfidious as to commit such unacceptable and punishable collusive acts... this should not rebound to the repute of the entire Nation, but that the criminals among them alone ought to be punished in an exemplary manner...It would be extremely harsh if those of the Jewish Nation who have already settled in Essequibo and Demerara, or are intending to settle there, should have to suffer because of the misdeed and perfidy of one or more of their Nation...and should be blamed for such matters." 137 In making this argument, they assumed that the authorities would be swayed by appeals to reason and justice.
But in case the governors were not be convinced by legal precedents and calls for fairness, the parnassim made sure to underscore the economic importance of the Jews to the colonies. They wrote the States General that:
The Suppliants...have, through their diligence and industry, as well as by bringing their treasures and property to this country, considerably contributed to continuing and maintaining the trade which is so highly needed by this Republic...[and that] it is now more than ever desirable, that everything possible be done to support and maintain trade and commerce in this country, to which end the exclusion of the Portuguese Jewish Nation from the said Colonies of Essequibo and Demerara, with respect, does not seem to be the right means, certainly not in this time in which even intolerant Princes, in order to support trade and commerce in their countries, have not only granted several rights to those of the Jewish Nation, and given them the same rights as their other subjects, but even have granted them privileges and immunities. 138 This passage, quoted at length because of its importance, illustrates that the Jewish community was well-aware of their past value to the Dutch colonies. Moreover, they not-so-subtly highlighted that the current economic situation was less than optimal so that "now more than ever" it was desirable to do anything possible to "support and maintain trade and commerce" by allowing Jewish settlement. The parnassim also deftly demonstrated a keen understanding of imperial rivalries by implying that they could take their trade elsewhere because "even intolerant Princes" had granted Jews rights and privileges comparable to those of their other subjects.
The States General agreed with the Jewish community's arguments. In a rather brief response, they recognised the legal precedence for Jewish settlement in Essequibo and Demerara and made reference to the resolution of 1657 upon which this right was based. They ordered that passports be granted to Jews wanting to travel to these colonies without delay. What is striking about this case was the confidence with which the Jewish community asserted its rights. Their petitions show a sure and certain knowledge of the legal justification for their settlement. Throughout the documents, they "demand" their rights and emphasised their "entitlement" to go where they wish within the Dutch Atlantic world. They are "respectfully confident" that their rights will be acknowledged and respected. Thus, their rhetoric is focused on legality and the fairness to which they are entitled as equal citizens.
For instance, when Rabba Couty's ship was seized, he first showed his license from an English colonial administrator, Colonel Francis Lovelace, who was the British governor of New York. When the Admiralty Court in Jamaica ruled against him, Couty sailed to New York in order to get yet another certificate from Lovelace that confirmed that he was "a Free Burgher of this Citty" and that his ship and crew were English. This was necessary for Couty to appeal the seizure of his ship to the king. The Privy Council was then given the task of investigating the case. They found that "the said sentence [in Jamaica] to be grounded on a presumption that the said Rabba Couty [was] not an Englishman." They further ruled that this was in opposition to colonial practice and that the certificates were sufficient to establish that Couty was "an Inhabitant and free Cittyzen of your Majestyes Plantations." Couty, then, used the legal structures in place regulating the English colonies to assert his rights and, ultimately, his belonging as a citizen in the English Atlantic.
Likewise, when Customs Inspector Hayne seized the ship Experiment, Antonio Gomesserra and Antonio Baruch Lousada, employed the legal structures available within the English (colonial) system. They took the case to an English jury. The merchants showed their patents of endenization from the Crown (issued in 1672 and 1675, respectively) in order to assert the fact that they were not officially aliens and, therefore, were not obliged to pay alien duties on the cargo that Hayne had seized. 158 Despite the fact that Hayne argued that an Alien customs fee should be charged to all Jewish merchants because a Jew could never be an Englishman, the legal system to which Lousada and Gomesserra appealed ruled in their favour.
The Jews had also employed rhetoric underscoring legality, justice, and economic utility when, about 125 years before, they appealed Peter Stuyvesant's discriminatory actions in New Netherland. But in contrast to the appeals made at the end of the eighteenth century, the Jewish community in the mid-seventeenth century also used arguments which underscored their loyalty and belonging. Perhaps this difference in the language employed by the parnassim in the latter part of the eighteenth century hints that there had been a progression in terms of their confidence in their legal position in the Republic and its overseas possessions. Be that as it may, they felt compelled to emphasise loyalty and assert belonging in the seventeenth century. To prove this loyalty and to assert this belonging, they demanded to fulfil duties associated with citizenship, such as serving in the civil militias. This was the case not just in New Netherland, but also in Curaçao and other Dutch Atlantic colonies.
When Stuyvesant tried to expel Jewish refugees from Dutch Brazil from New Amsterdam, the Jewish community in Amsterdam sprang into action on behalf of their co-religionists. They petitioned the Amsterdam chamber of the WIC and reminded the directors that not all the refuges could be accommodated in Amsterdam and that preventing Jewish immigration to New Amsterdam would "hinder the Company" economically. The country around New Netherland was "extensive and spacious" and there was a great deal of income to be derived from Jews living there. 139 These were all the standard arguments in favour of Jewish colonial settlement based on economic utility. But the parnassim also used the language of loyalty and fairness. It would be "unfair" to those Jews who had "at all times been faithful" and who had risked their "possessions and their blood" for the Company in Brazil. After all, the parnassim wrote, "the more of loyal people that go to live [in the colonies] the better it would be." Thus, they cleverly asserted not only the economic utility of the Jews, but also the Jews as loyal citizens-loyal citizens to whom the WIC had an obligation because of their losses in Brazil.
The WIC agreed with the Amsterdam Jewish community on all the grounds upon which they had argued. They wrote Stuyvesant that the Jews should be allowed to settle in New Netherland because "of the large amount of capital they still have invested in shares of the company." The Jews had suffered considerable losses in Brazil. Therefore, the WIC directors concluded, it would be "somewhat unreasonable and unfair" to send them away from New Netherland. Economic usefulness and fairness, combined, had swayed the directors of the WIC in favour of the Jews. But the arguments were not enough to convince Stuyvesant and his council to welcome Jewish settlement.
Asser Levy's attempts to assert his rights in New Netherland, briefly mentioned above, are a case in point. 140 In 1655, Levy demanded to be allowed to fulfil the obligations of citizenship within the colony by serving in the civil guard. In a resolution passed that same year, Stuyvesant and his council exempted Jews from military service in the civil guard and imposed a special tax on them in lieu of serving. This exclusion was justified because the captains and other members of the militia felt "aversion and disaffection...to be fellow soldiers...and to mount guard in the same guardhouse" with Jews. 141 Moreover, they pointed out that Jews in Amsterdam or other Dutch cities did not serve in the civil militias, and, instead, paid a fee in exchange for service. However, Levy (and fellow Jew Jacob Barsimson) argued that they could not afford the exemption fee. 142 Indeed, it is likely that as manual labourers Levy and Barsimson would have had trouble paying the exemption fee. But it is also the case that serving in the militia, as other male settlers did, was part and parcel of belonging to the larger community. In the Dutch Republic civic militias were of great importance, especially as a means of political mobilisation for the middle classes. 143 Serving in the civil militias, particularly in the colonies, similarly demonstrated the fulfilment of obligations to the larger community by a (male) citizen, and, in turn, there was understood to be a reciprocal obligation on the part of this community to the citizen who served. Levy was eventually allowed to serve.
Thus, when Asser Levy was initially denied a certificate of citizenship in New Amsterdam in 1657, he claimed that "burgherschap [in New Netherland] ought not be refused him as he keeps watch and ward like other Burghers." 144 With this statement, he asserted quite clearly that he had fulfilled his obligations to the community and, therefore, should not be refused the rights inherent in holding citizenship. The council's initial refusal of citizenship rights was detrimental to Levy on several fronts. Burghers of New Amsterdam were clearly distinguished from non-burgers who were unable or unwilling to make the same commitment to belonging to this new urban community. 145 This belonging played itself out symbolically and practi-cally. If Levy was not a citizen of New Amsterdam, his rights to trade would be severely limited. Not to be denied, Levy appealed and asserted his rights to citizenship based on legal arguments, in addition to his claim of having served in the militia, showing that he was fulfilling the obligations of a (male) citizen. He showed his certificate (poortersbrief) of citizenship from the city of Amsterdam to legitimate his claim. The representatives of the Jewish community petitioned the directors of the WIC on his behalf (and on behalf of the other Jews in the colony). They wrote that "We should enjoy all the same privileges as other inhabitants of New Netherland... [and] that our nation enjoys in the City of Amsterdam in Holland...We reverently solicit that you will not now exclude us from the rank of citizens, but rather to incline the Hon. Burgomasters that they will permit us to enjoy with other citizens their privileges, and grant to each person who might solicit that favour, a certificate of their citizenship." 146 The parnassim went on to emphasise that "Our nation, as long as we resided here [Amsterdam] did bear her share with others in every burden of the citizens." 147 For the representatives of the Jewish community in Amsterdam, Levy was a burgher in Amsterdam and, therefore, was entitled to be a burgher in New Amsterdam. Thus, for Levy and his fellow Jews, his rights and responsibilities should be equal in the colonies and in the metropole. Moreover, they highlighted that their community had shared the responsibilities ("burdens") of other citizens. They were, therefore, responsible, loyal, and worthy of the privileges of citizenship in New Netherland.
The claim that one was a responsible community member who, in turn, expected certain privileges for supporting the government was exercised by many settlers in Dutch-controlled territories when they first ventured into the Atlantic world. 148 As Wim Klooster notes, "In other New World holdings of the WIC like Curaçao, participation in the burgher guard was an obligation of a citizen." 149 On Curaçao, each man-Dutch-born or not-who took up his abode on the island, was registered with the civic guard after a stay of one year and six weeks. In fact, as Klooster points out, citizenship, as a concept, lost its rationale on Curaçao beyond the military obligation of serving in the civil guard. 150 Thus, excluding Jewish men from serving in the civil militias, in a matter of speaking, excluded them from citizenship, a point implicitly recognised by the Prussian correspondent of the Surinamese Jewish community, C.W. von Dohm, when he inquired of them, "Have you the right to defend the common fatherland as soldiers, and to serve it as civil or military officers?"
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Excluding Jews from this right is just what fiscaal Petersen tried to do in 1737 and 1738 on Curaçao. Petersen submitted a report to the WIC directors saying that Jews should be excused from serving in the militia because they "were not adept at the use of arms" but should, instead, pay a tax in lieu of service.
152 This despite the fact that Jews had been noted by various observers as having been quite active in the military defence of the island, especially during the famous attack of the French pirate Jacques Cassard in 1713. 153 Peterson's attitude toward Jews serving in the military was hardly unique, and Jews were excluded from serving in the military and civil militias in most European lands until the nineteenth century. 154 This was certainly not the first time that service in the civil guard on Curaçao had served as the flashpoint for issues concerning the rights and privileges of Jews. When a conflict arose in 1701 about whether Jews should allow their slaves to work on Saturdays, the Jews refused, but they emphasised how, in times of peril, the Jews (and their slaves) had done voluntary guard duty on Saturdays and would again, should it be necessary. Although Jews were exempted from serving in the militia on Saturdays, the parnassim emphasised that Jews had served on Saturdays when the French attacked the island in 1673 and 1678, and during a pirate attack in 1684. 155 Likewise, Moses Naar of the citizens' company of the Portuguese Jewish community in Suriname was awarded a silver coffee service valued at 150 Dutch guilders for "showing zeal, vigilance, and good service" in an expedition against escaped negroes, including service on Saturday in 1740. 156 The Jewish community in the Dutch Atlantic, therefore, underscored their willingness to fulfil the obligations of all citizens, even if, according to their privileges, they did not have to.
The same issues about Jewish service in the civil militias popped up in the British Atlantic, as well. In the mid-eighteenth century Jews on Jamaica were required to serve in the civil guard, just like all other male citizens on the island, but they hoped to be excused from service during their Sabbath and holidays, as they were on Curaçao. When they appealed to the parnassim in London to lobby for their exclusion, they were strongly urged not to ask for special privileges. Instead, the parnassim in London gave them a dispensation if they served on the Sabbath or on Jewish holidays, especially if martial law was in force. 157 This was a clear attempt on the part of the leaders of the Jewish community in London to make sure that their brethren in the Atlantic colonies were, first and foremost, perceived as trustworthy and loyal settlers who fulfilled their obligations and not first and foremost as Jews.
All of these cases show that Jews were generally quite successful in appealing to the legal structures available for the assertion of their citizenship rights in both the Dutch and British Atlantic contexts. The Jews in the Atlantic, in time-honoured tradition, continually appealed to their "home" communities in Amsterdam and London. These communities, in turn, were skilful in employing legal and rhetorical arguments designed to influence the ultimate decision makers in the metropole for the assertion of their brethren's rights in the colonies. 159 The Jewish communities' claims to the rights and privileges inherent as citizens involved an intimate knowledge of the systems of law. But the assertion of these claims to citizenship meant employing not just a rhetoric of legality, but also a discourse of loyalty and belonging intended to emphasise the reciprocity of obligations between the state and its citizens.
Conclusion
The particular issue of the Jews in the British and Atlantic colonies in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries fits into current discussions about the emergence of nations and ideas of what it meant to belong to these nations as citizens. Until relatively recently, there were two opposing tendencies in the study of nations and citizenship. On the one side were studies asserting that nations already existed during the early modern period (or even earlier). 160 On the other side, some scholars posited the inherent modernity of nations. 161 Despite their seeming opposition, however, both outlooks view the nation as either a "natural" and inevitable phenomenon, or an historical product that was ideologically or politically constructed. 162 Tamar Herzog, in contrast, calls into question many of these assumptions employed in current debates on the emergence of nations in early modern Europe based on her studies of Spain and Spanish America. She writes that "communities are neither naturally given nor fictitiously imagined...communities are continuously shaped by a multiplicity of agents acting under a variety of circumstances and motives. They are created and modified through both agreement and conflict, and they reflect the working of different and often contesting models of communal construction and membership." 163 In Herzog's view, then, individuals and institutions were constantly engaged in fighting to preserve their privileges and, in the process, also in defining what it meant to be part of a community.
As this article has shown, the case of the Jewish communities in the British and Dutch Atlantics in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries supports Herzog's contentions. Jews constantly (re)negotiated contesting of models of communal construction and membership. They also needed to persistently assert their rights and privileges to belong to these communities. This is not surprising because the imperial project itself necessitated some sort of change in the perception of who belonged and who did not. Therefore, the categories of "foreigner" and "foreignness" carried a more ambivalent message.
The pragmatic imperatives of settlement and the development of colonial economies which argued for incorporating "foreigners" such as Jews into the imperial project also served to exacerbate the already existing tensions surrounding the inclusion of culturally, religiously, and/or ethnically distinct groups within the larger community, often with new complications particular to colonial settings. 164 Moreover, it brought to the fore the need to create a legal and, ultimately, a cultural framework in which culturally distinctive groups such as Jews could manoeuvre. The legal frameworks within which they operated established institutional routines for recognising their "otherness" and for providing them legal recognition and protection. 165 In practical terms, this meant the extension of citizenship, even if in a limited form: for instance, in the absence of the right to political representation, to Jews in the colonies.
The ways in which the extension of citizenship to Jews was perceived, contested, and asserted demonstrate the changing notions of cultural boundaries because citizenship itself implied a sharing of identities. There was an underlying assumption that Jews did not share the attributes of the rest of British or Dutch society and never could. Not even the most ardent supporters of Jewish colonisation argued for the innate "Britishness" or "Dutchness" of Jews. Ideas of belonging such as that expressed by polemicist William Romaine who wrote that, "our state can have no natural-born Subjects but Christian, and a natural-born Jew Christian Foreign Englishman, is such a Medly of Contradictions, that all the Rabbies [sic] in the World will never be able to reconcile them" were echoed, though admittedly to a lesser extent, in the Dutch Atlantic. 166 For instance, planters in Suriname (unsuccessfully) argued to exclude Jews from elections of members of the Council of Policy as "no other Christian nations permit or suffer Jews to take a hand in running the affairs of the country." 167 Despite these doubts about the incorporation of Jews into the (colonial) community, the Jewish community itself asserted their rights to belong, economically and socially, by employing the legal structures already in place for the protection of their privileges. But they also used the language of loyalty and service in order to empha-size the reciprocity of obligations. As part of this on-going process, Jews scrambled ideas of "national" allegiances and were active agents in the negotiation of citizenship rights across imperial boundaries. In a sense, the case of the Jews in the British and Dutch colonial orbits are a precursor to larger debates about national belonging and exclusion that that emerged in the nineteenth century with the idea of the nation-state. 
